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I. INTRODUCTION
The Principles of European Contract Law (PECL)' dedi-
cates Chapter 2 to the formation of the contract; that is, to regu-
late the process of the formation of the contract mainly through
the exchange of two declarations of will: the offer and the ac-
ceptance. 2 Once the acceptance is made and becomes effective,
the contract is concluded and the parties are bound by their
commitments. 3 Section 1 of Chapter 2 of the PECL is devoted to
* Commercial Law Professor, Carlos III University of Madrid.
1 COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CON-
TRACT LAW, PART I AND II COMBINED AND REVISED (Ole Lando & Hugh Beale eds.,
2000) [hereinafter PECLI.
2 The rules in Chapter 2 also apply to the modification and termination of a
contract. Usually the modification and termination of contracts follows the offer-
acceptance process.
3 See PECL, supra note 1, Chap. 2.
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the general provisions of contract formation, while Section 2 is
dedicated to contract formation through offer and acceptance.
The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 4 Article 2, Part 2,
regulates the formation of the contract mainly by the exchange
of offer and acceptance. As we will see, there are similarities
between the PECL and the UCC in the process of contract for-
mation, although there are also great divergences derived from
the different legal backgrounds of both texts. The PECL is
mainly a "European product" drafted in a continental style and
with a civil law system heritage, while the UCC is a "common-
law product." Despite their differences, the UCC has indirectly
influenced the PECL. Its impact comes from the consanguinity
that exists among the PECL, UNIDROIT Principles of Interna-
tional Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles)5 and the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)6 all of which were influenced by the UCC.
Furthermore, since two countries within the European Union,
the United Kingdom and Ireland, belong to the common-law
family, the PECL has also been drafted to take into account the
perspectives of their legal systems.
4 Uniform Commercial Code (1977) [hereinafter U.C.C.I.
5 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of In-
ternational Commercial Contracts (Rome, 1994) [hereinafter UNIDROIT
Principles].
6 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18, Annex 1, reprinted in 19 I.L.M.
668 [hereinafter CISGI.
For information about the formation of contracts under the CISG, see MARIA
DEL PILAR PERALES VISCASILLAS, LA FoRMACI6N DEL CONTRATO DE COMPRAVENTA
INTERNACIONAL DE MERCADERAS (1996) [hereinafter LA FoRMAcI6N].
For information about the formation of contracts under the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples, see COMENTARIO A Los PRINCIPIOS DE UNIDROIT PARA Los CONTRATOS DEL CO-
MERCIO INTERNACIoNAL 97-160 (David MorAn Bovio et al. eds., 1999).
For a comparison between the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles, and the
U.C.C., see generally David A. Levy, Contract formation under the Unidroit Princi-
ples of International Commercial Contracts, UCC, Restatement and CISG, 30 UCC
L.J. 249 (1998).
For information about the UNIDROIT Principles, see MICHAEL-JOACHIM
BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAw. THE UNIDROIT PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1997); Maria del Pilar
Perales Viscasillas, Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts:
Sphere of Application and General Provisions, 13 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 380
(1996).
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THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
Although the civil law and the common-law systems have a
common meeting - the analysis of contract formation problems
via the traditional separation into two declarations of will (offer
and acceptance) - there are also divergences that seem, at first
sight, impossible to solve. The PECL learned from the obstacles
that had to be overcome in its "precedents," particularly the
CISG and the UNIDROIT Principles, and has achieved a set of
rules balanced between the different principles that inspire
both common-law and civil law systems. This does not mean
that the contract formation rules of the PECL, or the entire text
of the PECL, were created on the basis of "melds" or "patches"
by selecting the most appropriate civil law or common-law
rules, or the rules common to the different legal systems. On the
contrary, the PECL evidences its own specific system. It has
been built on the basis of enabling commercial exchanges be-
tween the European Union Member States, influenced by devel-
oped trade practices, and on the basis of providing its own
autonomous interpretation of the rules of international trade in
accordance with the principles of uniformity and good faith.7
II. FREEDOM OF FORM: No CONSIDERATION OR CAUSE
In principle, contracts that are governed by the PECL are
not subject to any form or evidence requirement to determine
their validity, their effectiveness, or the existence of contractual
declarations of will. A contract may be concluded either ver-
bally or in writing, including electronic correspondence.8 PECL
Article 2:101 is clear in this respect: "A contract need not be
concluded or evidenced in writing nor is it subject to any other
requirement as to form. The contract may be proved by any
means, including witnesses."9
The principle of freedom of form is widespread in countries
with civil law traditions. This is unlike those countries with
common-law systems, although common-law systems have be-
come less strict about requiring that sales contracts be in writ-
ing. UCC section 2-201, entitled Formal Requirements: Statute
of Frauds, requires written evidence in order to prove the exis-
tence of contracts of more than $500, which implies that a con-
7 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:106.
8 See id. art. 1:301.
9 Id. art. 2:101.
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tract is required to be in writing not for its formation, but
rather, for its enforceability. 10 The principle of freedom of form
implies that the offer and acceptance need not be in writing.
Moreover, in PECL Article 2:101, the formal requirements for
the conclusion of a contract are reduced in such a way that a
contract is concluded if the parties intend to be legally bound
and reach a sufficient agreement without any further require-
ment. 1 This implies that the contract can be concluded without
the existence of the formal and typical requirement of the com-
mon-law system known as consideration,12 and without the re-
quirement of causa, or cause, in civil law systems.' 3 In fact, this
clearly shows the way common-law systems are changing as
they find the requirement for consideration more restrictive.' 4
Such freedom is also in accordance with the general principle
embodied in CISG Article 11 and UNIDROIT Principles Article
1.2, which both reflect the common understanding in the civil
law tradition. 15
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT: THE PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE AND MERGER CLAUSES
Merger clauses, or clauses that restrict acceptable forms of
proof are frequently used by contracting parties under common-
law systems and are relatively unknown in civil law systems.
This is because, in common-law systems, the well-established
parol evidence rule prevents the interpretation of the party's in-
tentions in their negotiations when a written contract exists
that expressly states - as in a merger clause - that all elements
agreed upon by the parties are contained in that contract.
The parol evidence rule also comes into play in those con-
tracts where merger clauses do not exist. In order to apply the
rule under those circumstances, the judge must determine if the
written contract reflects all or only part of the terms of the
agreement. In the first case, the contract is considered "com-
pletely integrated," without the possibility of admitting any va-
10 See U.C.C. § 2-201.
11 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:101.
12 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 17, 71, 79.
13 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:101.
14 See e.g., U.C.C. § 5-105.
15 See CODIGO DE COMERCIO [hereinafter C. COM.] art. 51 (Sp.); CODmO CMqL
[hereinafter C.C.] art. 1278 (Sp.).
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THE FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
riation in the terms of the written contract, unless proven
otherwise. In the second case, the contract is considered "par-
tially integrated," and may be modified to the extent that the
parties agree to additional terms that are consistent with the
contract, rejecting those that are contrary to its written term.16
The PECL, following UNIDROIT Principles Article 2.17 on
this issue, contains a provision relating to merger clauses that
attempts to include the Anglo-American doctrine in its text. In
particular, PECL Article 2:105(4) provides that one party may
not allege a merger clause when the other party has reasonably
relied upon the declarations or conduct of the former. 17 At the
same time, PECL Article 2:105(2) states that if the merger
clause was not independently negotiated by the parties, it will
be presumed that they intended their previous declarations or
agreements not to form a part of the contract.18 Finally, PECL
Article 2:105(3) provides that the parties may not exclude or re-
strict this rule.19
Despite such differences in content between the American
doctrine and the text of the PECL, it must be noted that the
meaning of the articles is the same. By virtue of a written
merger clause, the contracting parties agree in writing that any
previous declaration or agreement will be considered irrelevant.
A merger clause also extends its effect to the modification of the
contract. Invoking the principle of freedom to negotiate in
PECL Article 1:102, the PECL verifies that incorporating such
a clause into the contract does not pose any problem. 20 Neither
the wording of PECL Article 2:105 itself nor, any clause similar
to it, which is incorporated into the contract excludes the possi-
bility that previous negotiations may be used to interpret what
16 For a discussion of completely and partially integrated contracts, see James
Gordley, An American Perspective on the Unidroit Principles, in CENTRO DI STUDI E
RICERCHE DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E STRANIERO. RoMA: 22 SAGGI, CONFERENZE E
SEMINARI (1996) (who indicates the problems that American jurisprudence has in
determining when a written contract is partially or completely integrated). See
also, David H. Moore, The Parol Evidence Rule and the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Justifying Beijing Metals & Min-
erals Import/Export Corp. v. American Business Center, Inc., BYU L. REV. 1352
(1995).
17 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:105(4).
18 See id. art. 2:105(2).
19 See id. art. 2:105(3).
20 See id. art. 2:102.
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is in writing.21 Furthermore, merger clauses do not extend to
the negotiations or to agreements that take place following the
conclusion of the contract.
Clauses that attempt to restrict modifications to the con-
tract are, like merger clauses, usually used by parties from
countries with an Anglo-Saxon legal tradition. Such clauses are
known in common-law systems as "no oral modification clauses"
(NOM clauses).22 By agreeing to such a clause, the parties to a
contract attempt to avoid its modification in any way other than
by writing. In this way, they seek to avoid changes to the con-
tract of which the parties involved in the transaction are not
clearly aware. The requirement that modifications to the con-
tract must be made in writing creates an exception to the gen-
eral rule that contractual modification or termination is not
subject to any formal requirement; that is, that modification
can be carried out verbally, in writing, or by acts of perform-
ance. PECL Article 2:106 clearly establishes that a NOM
clause only presumably provides for a writing requirement for
the modification of a contract. 23 However, this provision may
remain ineffective because of the declarations or actions of one
of the parties.
IV. FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT: EXCHANGING AN
OFFER FOR ITS ACCEPTANCE?
PECL Chapter 2, Section 2 and UCC Part 2, Article 2 follow
the classic pattern of two declarations of will, offer and accept-
ance, in deeming a contract concluded. The adoption of this pro-
cess is justified for two reasons: 1. the great majority of legal
systems have adopted it; and 2. it makes analyzing the forma-
tion of the contract easy for the parties, judges or arbitrators.
Nevertheless, at times it is difficult to determine what exactly is
an offer or an acceptance, such as when negotiations are long
and complicated. Such occurrences, however, would not prevent
the conclusion of a contract, even though the moment when con-
21 See id. art. 2:105.
22 See U.C.C. § 2-209(2); See also Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas,
Tratamiento Juridico de las Cartas de Confirmaci6n en la Convenci6n de Viena de
1980 sobre Compraventa Internacional de Mercaderias, 13 REVISTA JURIDICA DEL
PERIU (TRuJILLO) 241, Introduction (1997).
23 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:106.
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clusion occurs cannot be easily determined or the offer and ac-
ceptance cannot be clearly identified. Naturally, the fact that
the contract is being performed by both parties is sufficient to
prove that at some prior point, the contract was concluded.
Some of the general provisions of the PECL regarding the
formation of the contract recognize this practical issue, as did
the UCC long ago. A doctrine similar to the one stated in UCC
section 2-204 and in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section
22, was adopted in PECL Articles 2:101 and 2:211.24 Therefore,
the possibility of submitting every contractual formation pro-
cess to the traditional offer and acceptance pattern is conceiva-
ble, with adjustments. The fact that a contract does not follow
the traditional pattern and is consequently concluded without
isolating the offer and the acceptance, does not detract from the
value of the rules set forth in PECL Chapter 2. However, it
must be recognized that finding the precise moment in which
the contract is concluded could be very difficult if there is no
offer and acceptance. In any case, the contract must be deemed
concluded, failing other conclusive proof, either when there is
sufficient agreement between the parties or when there is per-
formance of the contract by both parties.
It should also be noted that the concept of contract embod-
ied in the PECL includes not only the common law concepts of
bilateral and unilateral contracts, but also the civilian concepts
of contracts with reciprocal obligation and unilateral promises,
which are binding without acceptance and are not considered
contracts. 25
V. THE OFFER: ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
PECL Article 2:201 establishes the minimum essential ele-
ments that must be found in order for a proposal to amount to
an offer. These requirements are: 1. the terms must be suffi-
ciently definite; and 2. the offeror must intend for the proposal
to result in a contract if the other party accepts it (i.e. it must
indicate the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of its
acceptance.) The PECL and UNIDROIT Principles Article 2.2
do not set requirements for the definiteness of an offer as does
24 See also, UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.1.
25 See PECL, supra note 1, arts. 2:101, 2:107.
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the CISG. The CISG follows the general rule of civil law sys-
tems, which requires that contracts, and by extension, offers
contain the so-called essentiala negotii. The PECL, in contrast,
adopts the more flexible approach as taken from common law
countries in which the will of the parties (i.e. the agreement)
and their intention to be bound by the agreement, are the essen-
tial elements for the conclusion of the contract. Under the
PECL, any gaps are filled by implied terms, 26 the reasonable
principle,27 common uses, established practices between the
parties,28 or by the tribunal if it is able to find an appropriate
remedy.29
Under the CISG, for an offer to be considered sufficiently
definite it must identify the goods, quantity and price. 30 By not
fixing the essential elements necessary for the conclusion of a
contract, the PECL has not only followed a more practical and
logical approach, especially in light of the fact that in addition
to sales contracts, the PECL applies to civil and commercial
contracts, but it also has avoided many of the problems that
arose under the CISG, especially those related to open price
contracts.
Is it possible to have a contract that says nothing about the
price element? Western legal systems are not in agreement on
the treatment of this question. While Spanish and French
law,31 among others, do not permit the existence of a contract
without a specified price, common-law systems like those of the
United States and England 32 allow for the existence of contracts
lacking the price element. The question is a complicated one
under the CISG and it was also greatly debated during prior
drafting sessions. On the one hand, CISG Article 14 requires
that the price appear in the offer of a contract, while on the
other hand, CISG Article 55 establishes a method to cure the
26 See id. art. 6:102.
27 See id. art. 6:104; U.C.C. § 2-305.
28 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:105.
29 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
30 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 14(1).
31 See C.C., supra note 15, arts. 1449, 1450.
32 See U.C.C. § 2-305; Sale of Goods Act, art. 8 (1979) (Eng.). But see GERMAN
CVIL CODE § 317 [hereinafter BGB]; AuSTRIAN CIVIL CODE §1054 [hereinafter
ABGB]; ITALIAN CIL CODE §1474 [hereinafter C.c.]; Swiss CODE OF OBLIGATIONS
§212.1 [hereinafter OR].
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lack of the price element when the contract has been validly
concluded. In particular, CISG Article 55 indicates that one
must apply the price generally charged for such goods sold
under comparable circumstances in the trade concerned at the
time of the conclusion of the contract.
Commentators on this question have expressed divergent
opinions. Some consider the existence of a contract without the
price to be impossible, except in very particular circumstances
(i.e., when countries have made a reservation under CISG Arti-
cle 92.) Others hold that it is indeed possible to conclude such a
contract and that the method for determining the price con-
tained in CISG Article 55 would adequately fill that gap. 33 Fi-
nally, there are those who regard the issue as a question of
validity that must be judged in accordance with applicable do-
mestic law.
In principle, a correct interpretation of CISG Articles 14
and 55 would first seek to determine the meaning of the expres-
sion "when the contract has been validly concluded," which are
the introductory words of CISG Article 55. Under CISG Article
55, it seems that a contract may be validly concluded without
the price being included if the will of the parties, either ex-
pressly or implicitly expressed,3 4 leads to that conclusion. This
is something that certainly occurs in those cases in which a con-
tract has been performed. Consequently, it is recognized that
when the price element indicated in CISG Article 14 is implic-
itly excluded from the contract, the contract may nevertheless
still be valid, in which case such exclusion must be interpreted
in light of CISG Article 8. More problematic, however, are those
situations in which the contract has not been performed. The
case law that has addressed this issue has held that it is impos-
sible to consider a contract to be concluded under those circum-
stances. For example, a contract cannot be considered con-
cluded when the offer 35 does not mention the price of the
33 See generally JOHN 0. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 137 (3d ed. 1999); Vincente Fortier,
Le prix dans la Convention de Vienne sur la Vente Internationale de Marchandises:
Les Articles 14 et 55, 2 Journal du Droit International 389 (1990); LA FORMACION,
supra note 6, at 315.
34 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 6.
35 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 19(1).
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goods, 36and additionally provides no guidelines for determining
a price.37
Another departure from the CISG is that the PECL unifies
the legal treatment of the so-called "offer to the public." The
CISG requires that the offer be addressed to one or more spe-
cific persons, making that which is addressed to the general
public only an invitation to receive an offer in the future.38 That
is to say, so-called public offers are not offers in the sense of the
CISG unless the offeror clearly indicates otherwise, or rather,
expressly indicates that the declaration directed to the general
public is in fact an offer. Nevertheless, between those cases in
which an offer is addressed to one or more specific persons, and
those in which an invitation to make an offer is addressed to the
general public, there are certain intermediate situations whose
legal classification is not clear. These include common cases of
mailings of catalogs, prospectuses, pamphlets or similar materi-
als to a certain number of people identified by name (i.e., the
name of a company or personal details identifying an employer),
and in which all other elements of CISG Article 14 are con-
tained. Such cases must be treated as if they were invitations to
make offers39 since in international commercial trade the use of
these materials has a perfectly clear purpose: to convey infor-
mation or to motivate the recipient to make an offer.
As mentioned earlier, the PECL's approach is slightly dif-
ferent from the CISG in that under the PECL, an offer may be
made to one or more specific persons or to the public.40 Such a
proposal would generally be considered as an offer, although it
may also be considered an invitation for an offer, depending on
36 See, e.g., the Supreme Court for the Republic of Hungary held that a con-
tract for airplane motors which did not set the price of the motors being offered,
and where performance was lacking, could not be considered concluded. United
Technologies International Inc., Pratt and Whitney Commercial Engine Business
v. Magyar Legi Kozlekedesi Vallalat (Ma lev Hungarian Airlines), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920925hl.html.
37 See, e.g., Judgment of March 4, 1994 (Provincial Court of Appeal, Frank-
furt, Germany 1994), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/940304qI.html.
38 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 14.
39 See generally, LA FORMACION, supra note 6, at 287 et seq.; Hormold, supra
note 33, § 136; E. Allan Farnsworth, Formation of Contract, in INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS, 3.03 (Galston & Smith ed., 1984); PETER SCHLECTRIEM, COMMEN-
TARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (2d ed. 1998).
40 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:201(2).
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the circumstances (i.e., an advertisement selling a house) and
on the intention of the offeror. At the same time, a proposal to
supply goods or services for a certain price made by a profes-
sional supplier in a public advertisement or a catalogue, or by a
display of goods, is presumed to be an offer to sell or supply at
that price until the stock of goods, or the supplier's capacity to
supply the service, has been exhausted. This approach recog-
nizes the fact that the addressee of the offer may be a consumer.
Another notable similarity between the PECL and the UCC
is that both have found a way to overcome the rigid approach of
those civil law systems where the power that one of the con-
tracting parties or a third party may have to set certain terms
of the contract is taken into account. 41 According to PECL Arti-
cles 6:105 and 6:106 and UCC sections 2-305 and 2-306, the uni-
lateral determination of the price or any other contractual term
by one of the contracting parties or by a third party, is possi-
ble.4 2 The fact that the party making the determination exceeds
its power does not render the contract null or void, since a rea-
sonable price or term would be supplied by the court.
Finally, the UCC and the PECL also permit the setting of
the price by a third party, which is possible under the rigid
rules of civil law systems. However, the UCC and the PECL
have taken a different approach to that of civil law systems with
regard to those situations in which the third party cannot or
will not make the determination. In civil law systems, the con-
tract would be considered to have no effect,43 while under the
PECL the parties are presumed to have empowered the court to
appoint another person to determine the price. 44
VI. THE OFFER: WITHDRAWAL, REVOCATION AND EXPIRATION
Following the pattern of the CISG and the UNIDROIT
Principles, PECL Articles 2:202 and 2:203 are devoted to the
revocation and lapse of the offer. In the chapter dedicated to the
formation of the contract, there is no rule like that contained in
CISG Article 15 or in the UNIDROIT Principles Article 2.3 re-
41 See, e.g., C.C., supra note 15, art. 1449, which prohibits the unilateral de-
termination of the price by one of the parties.
42 See also UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 5.7(2)(3).
43 See C.C., supra note 15, art. 1447.
44 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 6:106(1).
20011
11
PACE INT'L L. REV.
lating to the withdrawal of an offer. In fact, there is no need for
one, since the revocation rule in PECL Article 2:202 can also
cover those situations in which the offeror changes his mind,
and consequently takes back, or revokes his offer.45 In any
event, the withdrawal of a notice, a concept that extends to the
offer and acceptance, is regulated under PECL Article 1:303(5)
and is a useful concept from a theoretical point of view. One
must take into account that the distinction between the with-
drawal and revocation is somehow artificial and that the with-
drawal has no practical impact due to the utilization of modern
means of communication. The withdrawal is only possible
when the offer has been sent by mail or telegraph and is limited
in effectiveness by the receipt principle. This means that the
withdrawal is only possible if the notification thereof reaches
the addressee before or at the same time as the offer.
The revocation of the offer is possible so long as the offer is
not irrevocable and it arrives to the offeree before he has sent
his notice of acceptance. 46 The PECL clarifies that an offer can
be revoked when its acceptance has been made by conduct
before the contract is concluded (i.e., when the offeror receives
notice of such actions or performance begins.)47 Also, the PECL
states that when an offer is made to the public, it can be re-
voked by the same means as were used to make the offer, fol-
lowing the approach taken in Restatement (Second) of Contracts
Section 46. This rule is not expressly adopted by the CISG, but
is defended by a number of scholars.48
Aside from the possibility of revoking an offer, which is re-
served for the offeror, the offeree may also terminate the offer
by means of a rejection. 49 The rejection becomes effective when
it reaches the offeror. The rejection of the offer prevents it from
45 In fact, under the legal system of the United States, the word "revocation"
covers both cases: the withdrawal and the revocation of the offer. See Peter Win-
ship, Formation of International Sales Contracts under the 1980 Vienna Conven-
tion, 23 INT'L LAw. 7 (1983). But see E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, ON CONTRACTS §3.17
(3d ed. 1999).
46 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:202(1). Cf CISG, supra note 6, art. 16(1);
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.4(1).
47 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:205.
48 See LA FORMACION, supra note 6, at 476. But see C.c., supra note 32, art.
1336, which allows for the revocation to be made by similar means.
49 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:203; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 2.5; CISG, supra note 6, art. 17.
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coming back to life, for example, if the offeree changes his mind
about rejecting the offer and attempts to accept it again. This
Rule is followed by the majority of legal systems, although there
are some significant exceptions, such as option contracts under
common-law systems as derived from Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 37.50
VII. IRREVOCABILITY OF THE OFFER
One of the most controversial rules under the CISG is the
one relating to the irrevocability of an offer. Just as the CISG
establishes the general rule of when an offer can be revoked, it
also sets out when an offer can be considered irrevocable. The
CISG states that an offer cannot be revoked: 1. if it indicates,
whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise,
that it is irrevocable; or 2. if it was reasonable for the offeree to
rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has acted
in reliance on the offer. 5'
In commercial trade, the most common way for the offeror
to indicate the irrevocability of an offer is to show that it is
irrevocable either by stating such or by using other forms of ex-
pression with a similar meaning. In that sense, the offeror can
expressly declare that his offer is irrevocable through clauses
such as: "I guarantee my offer for 15 days," "I will hold this offer
open during a period of 30 days," "I promise not to revoke this
offer until ...," "offer binding during the indicated period" or,
finally, simply by declaring that his proposal is irrevocable.5 2
These examples, that correspond to the wording of the CISG,
"an offer cannot be revoked: if it indicates [... I that it is irrevo-
cable," 53 are convenient and simple examples of offers in which
the offeror's commitment not to revoke his offer is doubtlessly
indicated through clear expressions or words that are generally
understood in trade as the will to be bound. This is also the ap-
proach taken by PECL Article 2:202(3)(a). 54
50 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 37.
51 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 16.
52 See Gyula Eorsi, Revocability of Offer, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 157 (Bianca & Bonell
eds., 1987).
53 CISG, supra note 6, art. 16(2)(a); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art.
2.4(2)(a).
54 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:202(3)(a).
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A different problem arises when the offeror neither ex-
pressly nor tacitly indicates if the offer is irrevocable, but rather
sets out a fixed period of time in which the offeree can accept
the offer. The stating of a fixed period of time to accept (i.e. "you
have twenty days to accept the offer") in many legal systems,
especially those with German influences, indicates the general
rule of irrevocability of the offer.55 In common law systems on
the other hand, it does not imply irrevocability, but rather just
the opposite. As a general rule, common law systems follow the
revocability of the offer, irrevocability being the exception.
Those exceptions are: an offer under seal,56 an option with con-
sideration,57 a firm offer 58 or the application of the doctrine of
detrimental reliance, also known as promissory estoppel.59 In
any case, the power of the offeror to revoke his offer ends when
the acceptance is sent.60 Under the CISG, however, it is not
clear whether a fixed period of time for acceptance means that
the offer is irrevocable, or that a time period exists for the of-
feree to accept the offer, past which time the offer expires.
This ambiguity results from the very wording of CISG Arti-
cle 16(2)(a), which was written imprecisely because no agree-
ment could be reached on the meaning of a fixed period of time
for acceptance. The differences between common-law and civil
law61 approaches prevented a unanimous solution. The conse-
quence of the compromise will most likely be divergent interpre-
tations by the courts. While some authors consider that an offer
which indicates a period for acceptance, expressly or tacitly, in-
55 See BGB, supra note 32, § 145.
56 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 95 et. seq.; U.C.C. § 2-203.
57 See Payne v. Cave, 3 Term Rep. 653, 100 E.R. 492 (1789); Oxford v. Davies,
12 C.B., N.S. 748 (1862); Dickinson v. Dodds, L.R.2 Ch.d. 463 (1876). See gener-
ally, FARNSWORTH, supra note 45; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 42;
JOHN E. MURRAY, ON CONTRACTS 111 (3d ed. 1990).
58 See U.C.C. § 2-205. In civil law systems, the use of the expression "firm
offer" will amount to an irrevocable offer. Under U.C.C. § 2-205, the firm offer has
a similar meaning, although several conditions must be met in order for it to apply.
59 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
60 See generally Adams v. Lindsell, 106 E.R. 250 (1818); FARNSWORTH, supra
note 45; CHrrry, ON CONTRACTS (Volume 1, 27' ed. 1994); SAMUEL A. WILLISTON,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 378 (Volume 2, 4 th ed. 1990); MURRAY, supra
note 57, at 148.
61 See, e.g., BGB, supra note 32, § 145; U.C.C. § 2-205.
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dicates that it is irrevocable, 62 others maintain the exact oppo-
site position, which is, that the offer simply sets out a period of
time for acceptance, but not for irrevocability. The position that
appears to have the most success among commentators is that
which indicates that such a question will have to be left up to
the courts. 63
The PECL, conscious of the divergent solutions under the
CISG, solves the problem in PECL Article 2:202(3)(b), by stat-
ing that the revocation of an offer is ineffective if it states a
fixed period of time for its acceptance. 64 Again, this seems to be
a sensible approach, especially if one considers that the PECL is
also applicable to consumer contracts.
Another way in which an offer may be considered irrevoca-
ble, even when the offeror has not indicated so, is when an offer
creates the appearance to the offeree of being irrevocable and
the offeree carries out some type of action in reliance on the of-
fer. This doctrine, also known as promissory estoppel, which is
derived from common-law systems,65 is also recognized in civil
law systems as the general principle of venire contra factum
propium. In such situations, the offeror cannot revoke his of-
fer.66 This is because those situations in which a period of time
is set for acceptance could create the understanding by the of-
feree that the offer is irrevocable. Thus, if the offeree carries out
some type of action related to the offer, such as investments in
his company or purchase of materials, hiring of experts, consul-
tants, lawyers, etc., he can rely on the protection of the PECL. 67
62 See generally John E. Murray, An Essay on the Formation of the Contracts
and related problems under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, 8 J.L. & COM. 25 (1988).
63 See LA FORMACI6N, supra note 6, at 436. See also Luis Diez Picazo, La Com-
praventa Internacional de Mercaderias, in COMENTARIO DE LA CONVENCI6N DE VI-
ENNA 176 (Madrid, 1998).
64 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:202(3)(b).
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90; FARNSWORTH, supra note
45, § 2.19, § 3.25; J.D. CALAMARI AND J.M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 6-
1, 6-7 (3d ed. 1987)
66 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:202(3)(c); CISG, supra note 6, art. 16(2)(b);
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.4(2)(b).
67 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87; FARNSWORTH, supra note
45, § 3.25; MuRRAY, supra note 57, at 124.
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VIII. ACCEPTANCE
An acceptance is the positive response to an offer. It must
be made clear and unconditional by the acceptor. Acceptance
can take place in three ways: 1. by means of a declaration; 2. an
action; or 3. even by silence or inaction. 68 Unless the offeror sets
out a specific form of acceptance, the offeree is free to accept the
offer either verbally or in writing.69 The declaration of accept-
ance can either be written (a letter, telegram, telex, fax, e-mail,
etc.) or oral (either with the parties in person or over the phone,
on the radio, etc.) In both circumstances, in order for the accept-
ance to be effective and, in turn, conclude the contract, it must
reach the offeror within the time period established in the offer
or, in the absence of such provision, within a reasonable amount
of time. 70
An acceptance can also take place by means of conduct or
by acts of performance. When acceptance occurs by conduct
(such as raising a hand and nodding one's head), "the contract is
concluded when notice of such conduct reaches the offeror,"71
i.e., when he learns of it. If the acceptance takes place through
acts of performance (for example, by delivering the goods and
paying the price), it is not necessary to notify the offeror of ac-
ceptance, since the very act of delivery or payment concludes
the contract as long as it is made within the time set by the
offeror for acceptance, or within a reasonable amount of time if
no such period is set.72 Nevertheless, in order to accept through
performance without the need for sending a communication to
the offeror, it is necessary that the offer allow for such perform-
ance (i.e., "begin manufacturing," "send immediately," "buy in
my name without delay,"73 or "make payment to my account
number.. .") or that it is permitted by virtue of established prac-
tices of the contracting parties or by usage. 74 The approach
68 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:204.
69 See id.
70 See id. arts. 2:205(1), 2:206(1-2).
71 Id. art. 2:205(2).
72 See id. arts. 2:205(3), 2:206(3).
73 CISG, supra note 6, art. 18.(3), (see § 11 of the Secretariat's Commentary).
74 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:205(3).
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taken by the PECL is similar to that of CISG Article 1875 and is
also universally followed.76
Silence or inactivity does not in and of itself amount to ac-
ceptance. 77 Therefore, silence or inactivity, must be considered
along with other factors, in order to amount to an acceptance of
the offer. Such factors to consider are:78 1. legal provisions such
as in PECL Articles 2:208(3)(b) and 2:207, or CISG Articles
19(2) and 21; 2. usage and practices established between the
parties (i.e. customarily the offer-order is not answered but
rather the goods are delivered directly);7 9 and 3. the existence of
a duty to answer.80 Nevertheless, no value can be given to a
statement found in an offer establishing that silence on the part
of the offeree would be considered an acceptance, since, in that
case, the offeree would be bound from the very birth of the con-
tract by a simple unilateral declaration of the offeror.
75 See CISG, supra note 6, art. 18; LA FORMACION, supra note 6, at 534 et seq.
The PECL, unlike the CISG, discusses the acceptance by acts of performance
and does not include a rule related to the time limit for acceptance when the offer
is made orally. In the case of oral offers, the CISG requires that the acceptance be
immediate, unless circumstances indicate otherwise. In other words, the CISG es-
tablishes a more rigid period of time for acceptance for offers that are made orally,
than for offers that are made in writing.
76 See e.g., UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.6; U.C.C. § 2-206; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 30(1), 50.
77 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:204(3); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5;
CISG, supra note 6, art. 18.1.
78 See LA FORMACI6N, supra note 6, at 512.
79 See id.
80 That is exactly how the courts in the United States understood it in one of
the first cases to apply the CISG: Filanto v. Chilewich, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1229
(S.D.N.Y. 1992). As a matter of fact, the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York, in its ruling on April 14, 1992, was faced with the question of
whether a clause containing a submission to arbitration before the Moscow Cham-
ber of Industry and Commerce should be held to be incorporated into the contract.
The court first turned to Article II of the New York Convention of 1958. It then
proceeded to examine the norms on contract formation in the CISG to determine if
the parties had agreed to an arbitration clause. In conformity with the norms of
the CISG, in particular that relating to silence or inactivity of the offeree (CISG,
Article 18(1), the court found that the arbitration clause had to be understood as
forming part of the contract. The decision is logical because the offeree's silence or
inactivity was combined with his initiating the execution of the contract (opening
the letter of credit).
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IX. COUNTEROFFER
A declaration of acceptance must coincide with each and
every term of an offer in order to conclude a contract.8 1 This
requirement is known as the "mirror image rule," since the ac-
ceptance must be the very reflection of the offer, like that of a
reflection of an object in a mirror. However, there is an excep-
tion that allows for the possible introduction of new terms into
the acceptance that do not substantially alter the offer. In such
a case, the acceptance will be valid and the contract will consist
both of the terms of the offer and those included in the accept-
ance that do not substantially alter the offer, so long as the new
terms are not objected to by the offeror without delay,8 2 the of-
fer does not expressly limit acceptance to the terms of the of-
fer,83 the offeree does not make his acceptance conditional upon
the offeror's assent to the additional or different terms, and the
assent reaches the offeree within a reasonable period of time.8 4
On the other hand, if the element that is introduced in the
acceptance adds new terms, modifies the terms of the offer, or
introduces any other type of limitation in the offer that substan-
tially alters it, the contract will not be considered concluded,
and the response to the offer will become a counteroffer.8 5 The
offer still must meet all the requirements under the PECL to be
considered an offer in and of itself.86
81 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:208(1); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 2.11(1); CISG, supra note 6, art. 19(1).
82 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:208(3)(b), CISG, supra note 6, art. 19(2);
U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(c).
83 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:208(1); U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a).
84 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:208(3)(c ); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note
5, art. 2.11(2); U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
85 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:208.
86 See id. art. 2:208(1); UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.11(1);
CISG, supra note 6, art. 14; U.C.C. § 2-207.
In order to determine when an element that is introduced in an acceptance
materially alters the offer, thereby concluding the contract or not, a list of items is
provided by the CISG. This list merely provides examples of such elements, as can
be derived from the expression in CISG Article 19(3) "among other things." Fur-
thermore, the list has a presumptive nature since it predetermines that such "ad-
ditional or different terms . . . are considered to alter the terms of the offer
materially" (emphasis added.) The list includes the following elements: price-
only those modifications relating to the total amount of the offering price (Interna-
tionale Jute Maatschappij BV v. Marin Palomares S.L., (Supreme Court, Spain
2000), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/00012854.html); clauses that
modify the price because of increases in costs (Fauba France FDIS GC Elec-
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X. BATTLE OF THE FORMS
The battle of the forms is an expression that refers to a sit-
uation in which the parties exchange general conditions -
preprinted forms - that add one or more terms that materially
tronique v. Fujitsu Mikroelectronik Gmb H, (Supreme Court, France 1995), availa-
ble at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950104fl.html); method of payment
(Judgment of December 22, 1992, (District Court, Giessen, Germany 1992), availa-
ble at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/921222g2.html); quality and quantity of
merchandise (Judgment of March 31, 1995, (Provincial Court of Appeal, Hamm,
Germany 1995), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/950331gl.html);
place and time of delivery (Judgment of February 8, 1995 (Provincial Court of Ap-
peal, Munich, Germany 1995), available at httpY/cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/
950208gl.html); the extent of one party's liability to the other (Judgment of Au-
gust 14, 1991 (District Court, Baden-Baden 1991), available at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/910814gl.html); and the settlement of disputes. Never-
theless, it is very possible that courts consider the list in the sense that the afore-
mentioned terms substantially alter an offer in every case. For example, an
indication of a material alteration is the rejection of packaging bacon "in polyethyl-
ene bags" by means of a counteroffer in which the packaging is established as
"loose" (Judgment of September 22, 1992 (Provincial Court of Appeal, Hamm, Ger-
many 1992), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/920922gl.html). In or-
der to arrive at a clear set of rules for interpreting when a modification to an offer
is material or not, the term "material" must be interpreted in a limited way. See
FRANK ENDERLEIN AND DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 100
(1992).
The list that is offered contains only substantive elements that refer to rights
and obligations that arise in a sales contract, eliminating certain elements from
being considered material alterations, such as the initiative of the offeree to nego-
tiate again and small changes in the wording of the offer that have no effect on the
acceptance. An example of such non-material alterations is an acceptance in
which certain complaints are added ("I accept because I urgently need the mer-
chandise," or "I agree but was hoping for a more satisfactory agreement"), or rec-
ommendations are made or questions are asked ("I accept. Payment should be in
bills of 100 euros," or "I accept. Would it be possible to include an arbitration
clause?"), or requests are made ("Keep the acceptance confidential until it is an-
nounced publicly by both parties.") See United Technologies International Inc.
Pratt and Whitney Commercial Engine Business v. Magyar Legi Koumlz Lekedesi
Valla lat (Malev Hungarian Airlines), (Metropolitan Court, Budapest 1992), avail-
able at http://cisgw3.1aw.pace.edu/cases/920110h1.html. In the same way, the ad-
ding of a term that is an integral part of an offer in the response to that offer could
not be considered a material alteration for several possible reasons: because the
term would become a part of the applicable law governing the contract (for exam-
ple, repeating one of the provisions of the Convention); because it mentioned a
practice that is common between the parties or a usage that binds them; or be-
cause it is a term derived from good faith (for example, if one added in his accept-
ance, "in conformity with the usual standard of quality.") Finally, a modification of
an offer whose content benefits the offeror should not be considered material ei-
ther. See Judgment of March 20, 1997 (Supreme Court, Austria 1997), available at
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/970320a3.html.
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modify the offer. It is a controversial issue under the CISG,
where some scholars believe the last-shot rule applies, a rule
which has been rejected by UCC section 2-207(3), which instead
applies the knock-out rule.8 7 The PECL, following UNIDROIT
Principles Article 2.22, has adopted the common-law approach,
which is articulated in PECL Article 2:209.88
To find a solution to the conflict of the battle of the forms is
not easy. The situation is complicated by the customary practice
of sending offers and acceptances that contain general condi-
tions. Such conditions may reveal contradictions if litigation
arises and may raise the following two questions: "Has a con-
tract been concluded?" and, if so, "What are the terms of the
contract?" The opinion of the majority is that when forms are
used, the rules of the CISG should apply, and, consequently,
any variation of those forms would be a counteroffer. Such a
counteroffer would most certainly be accepted through some
type of act of performance. Below, some solutions that have
been given to the problem under the CISG will be examined to
show the different approaches to solving this critical issue of
contract formation.8 9
The battle of the forms is considered a gap that must be
resolved by applying the general principles that the CISG is
based upon. Following this approach, there is the belief that
the principle of good faith should apply, and that those clauses
contained in the forms which are contradictory should cancel
each other out, leaving the issue to be governed by the applica-
ble law, usage, or good faith. That is, they adopt the solution
that is followed in other countries' legal systems, such as the
United States' knock-out rule of UCC section 2-207(3), the par-
tiell dissens rule from German Civil Code sections 154 and 155,
or the solution from UNIDROIT Principles Article 2.22. A varia-
tion on this theory is that the situation produces an implied ex-
clusion of CISG Article 19.
87 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3).
88 See UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.22; PECL, supra note 1, art.
2:209.
89 See generally Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Battle of the Forms under
the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: A Comparison with Section 2-207 of the UCC and the Unidroit Principles,
10 PACE INT'L L. REV. 97 (1998).
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The approach that has been most widely followed leads to
the application of what is known as the last shot rule, under
which the last person to send his form is considered to control
the terms of the contract. An example of the application of this
rule is the following:
A German buyer ordered doors that had to be manufactured by
the seller according to his specifications. The seller sent the buyer
a confirmation letter that contained his general conditions of sale
on the back. Those conditions included the following statement:
"The seller must be notified of any defects of the merchandise
within eight days of delivery." Subsequently, the seller sent the
merchandise and the buyer received it.
In this example, the confirmation letter was considered a
counteroffer that became implicitly accepted by the buyer's con-
duct when he received the merchandise.
As shown, the different approaches lead to different an-
swers to the same problem. In solving this problem, the PECL
has decided to follow a more modern trend by applying the
knock-out rule to solve the battle of the forms problem, thus
adopting the innovative approach of the UCC.9°
XI. WRITTEN CONFIRMATION
Sending a confirmation letter following the conclusion of a
contract is a common practice in international commercial
transactions, as well as national transactions that take place
between businessmen. The purpose of such a letter is to set in
writing what was previously negotiated, to establish proof of
what was agreed to, and to eliminate or reduce doubts or errors
that might arise by setting out the terms by which the contract
is governed. When the terms contained in the confirmation no-
tice coincide with those that were actually agreed upon (i.e.,
they are a summary, exact repetition, or confirmation of such)
no problems exist. However, what usually happens is that prior
to, or simultaneous with the execution of the contract, a confir-
mation letter or invoice is sent out that alters or adds terms to
the contract, when the contract has already been formalized.
Such changes take place by including certain new elements, or
general conditions, or by adding an entire set of general condi-
90 See generally PECL, supra note 1.
20011
21
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tions that had not been previously discussed by the parties or
indicated as included in the contract, or conditions that provide
for something different than what was agreed upon. Such oc-
currences raise the question of how these confirmation letters
should be treated under applicable laws. 91
In countries such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland,
which place a great deal of importance on the legal treatment of
confirmation letters, a distinction is made between the Auftrag-
sbestdtigung and the Bestdtigunschreiben. The Auftragsbesta-
tigung, or confirmation of an order, has somewhat more
significance than a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of an
offer. It expresses the will to carry out what is asked for in the
contract, consequently comprising an acceptance (or counterof-
fer, in such case.) The Bestatigunschreiben, however, corre-
sponds with what is identified elsewhere as a letter of
confirmation. 92 Furthermore, when the contractual relationship
is between merchants, these countries provide that silence or
inactivity on the part of the recipient of the confirmation letter
produces an acceptance. However, even though said modifica-
tions may be accepted, this does not mean that the confirmation
letters containing them are regarded in the same light as the
original offer and acceptance.
In Anglo-American law, confirmation letters are regulated
in a similar manner to the battle of the forms issue,93 although
with certain differences. In particular, jurisprudence has indi-
cated that a confirmation conditional upon the recipient's ac-
ceptance of new terms is not possible because it would mean
imposing conditions on a contract that has already been con-
cluded.9 4 The way Anglo-American law regulates written con-
91 See Perales Viscasillas, supra note 22, at 241.
92 See generally Michael R. Will, Conflits entre Conditions Generales de Vente,
in LES VENTES INTERNATIONALES DE MARCHANDISES. COLLECTION DROIT DES AF-
FAIRES ET DE L'ENTERPRISES DIRIG8E PAR YVES GUYON (1981); Katherina S. Ludwig,
Der Vertragsschluss nach UN-Kaufrecht im Spannungsverhdltnis von Common-
Law und Civil-Law: Dargestellt auf der Grundlage der Rechtsordnungen Englands
und Deutschlands, in STUDIEN ZUM VEGLEICHENDEN UND INTERNATIONALEN RECHT
86, 88 (1994); KARL NousslAs, DIE ZUGANGSBEDORFTIGKEIT VON MITTEILUNGEN
NACH DEN EINHEITLICHEN HAAGER KAUFGESETZEN UND NACH DEM UN-KAUFGESETZ
121 (1992).
93 See U.C.C. § 2-207.
94 This would mean that the final part of U.C.C. § 2-207(1) would not be appli-
cable "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
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firmations of an already concluded contract is quite erroneous,
since it is difficult to understand how a confirmation letter that
includes new terms can be considered the acceptance of an offer.
To escape from this paradox, basically two solutions are pro-
posed by the doctrine: 1. understand it as an error in the rules
relating to offer and acceptance; or 2. understand that the con-
firmation acts to validate a verbal contract in conformity with
UCC section 2-201, which regulates the Statute of Frauds, a
rule requiring that sales contracts be in writing. Under these
solutions, a confirmation letter that is sent and not objected to
is considered sufficient to fulfill the requirements of UCC sec-
tion 2-201. Additionally, such a letter will give validity to the
contract under UCC section 2-207(2), or rather, function as an
acceptance of the terms of the contract.95 The case law on these
confirmations has required that they be reasonable, definitive,
and in writing, following a previous oral agreement.96 Further-
more, confirmations must be sent within a reasonable time
from the oral conclusion of the agreement. Additional terms in
the confirmation are considered proposals to modify the con-
tract that will automatically become part of the agreement un-
less they materially alter the contract or are objected to by
either of the parties.97 For those terms that differ, Official
Commentary Six indicates that the knock-out rule of UCC sec-
or different terms." JAMES WHITE AND ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 48 et seq. (1988).
95 See WILLISTON, supra note 60, at 255. But see MURRAY, supra note 57, at
171 (where the author states that there are two distinct problems and therefore
the two sections cannot be mixed); R.W. Duesenberg, Contract Creation: The Con-
tinuing Struggle with Additional and Different Terms under Section 2-207 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 34 Bus. LAw. 1477 (1979) (where the author has ana-
lyzed decisions-especially those of the courts of New York-that apply U.C.C. § 2-
201(2) with the goal of solving the battle of the forms or confirmation letters,
thereby confusing two sections whose objectives are different).
96 Since, if it were an agreement in writing, any written confirmation follow-
ing such would be considered an attempt to modify the contract under U.C.C. § 2-
209, which addresses modification, rescission and waiver, or even U.C.C. § 2-208,
which addresses course of performance or practical construction.
97 See U.C.C. § 2-207.
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tion 2-207(3) is to be applied. 98 None of the other commentaries
throughout this section oppose this solution. 99
The solution at which the PECL arrives is simple: it applies
the rules of offer and acceptance from Chapter 2 of the PECL.
With a similar solution to that of PECL Article 2:208 relating to
acceptances with modifications, PECL Article 2:210 provides
that additional or different terms that are included in a confir-
mation letter become part of the contract unless they substan-
tially alter the terms of the contract, or the recipient of the
letter objects, without delay, to their inclusion.
XII. CONCLUSION OF THE CONTRACT: TIME AND PLACE
The moment in which a contract is concluded under the
framework of the PECL is summarized in PECL Article
2:205.100 The PECL follows the receipt theory in determining
the moment when a contract is concluded. 10 PECL Article
2:205, sections (1) and (2) state that "if an acceptance has been
dispatched by the offeree the contract is concluded when the ac-
ceptance reaches the offeror, or in the case of acceptance by con-
duct, when the notice of the conduct reaches the offeror." The
issue of what is meant by "reaches" is clarified by PECL Article
1:303(3).102 Therefore, the PECL sets up a general system to
indicate that declarations of acceptance and any indication of
intention become effective at the moment of their arrival, that
is, when they are received by the offeree. The use of the term
"reaches" in the English version of the PECL corresponds to the
98 See U.C.C. § 2-207 Official Commentary Six (1977). But see CALAM w AND
PERILLO, supra note 65, at § 2-21 (the authors suggest that where additional terms
exist that are not contradictory to the other terms of the contract, UCC § 2-207(2)
applies. If a contradiction does exist, the terms would not form part of the content
of the contract, which will, therefore, be made up of the terms previously agreed
upon, those that coincide between the forms and, lastly, those that would apply in
conformity with the provisions of the UCC).
99 See generally Caroline Brown, Restoring Peace in the Battle of the Forms: A
Framework for Making Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207 Work, 69 N.C. L.
REV. 940 (1991); FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 3.21 (regarding those terms that do
not materially alter the contract); WILLISTON, supra note 60, § 6:25.
100 See also CISG, supra note 6, art. 23; Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas,
Contract Conclusion Under the CISG, 16 J.L. & COM. 315 (1997).
101 See also CISG, supra note 6, art. 23; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 2.6(2).
102 See also CISG, supra note 6, art. 24; UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5,
art. 1.9(3).
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phrase "receives" in the American UCC,1O3 or to what is known
in the German system as zugehen, and in general to the "recep-
tion theory" in respect to written declarations.
The conclusion of the contract can be inhibited if the accept-
ance is withdrawn before or at the same time as it would have
become effective. 104 Thus, it is evident that, just as is the case
with a withdrawal of an offer, a withdrawal of an acceptance is
only possible when the declaration of acceptance has been sent
by mail or telegraph. The Reception Theory or Receipt Theory,
which is also known as Zugangstheorie or Empfangstheorie in
the German system and Teoria de la Recepci6n in the Spanish
system, 0 5 requires that declaration of will be received in order
to conclude a contract. The CISG adopts it as a general rule to
all written declarations of will and any form of communication
found in PECL Chapter 2. Since it is well established in com-
mon law systems that the mailbox rule is not applicable when
the offeree uses means of communication other than the mail or
telegraph, 10 6 a contract is concluded "upon receipt" of the ac-
ceptance when the offeree uses means of instantaneous commu-
nication (i.e., telex, fax, electronic data interchange (EDI), and
electronic mail (E-mail.))
In cases in which the contract is accepted by acts of per-
formance of the type described in PECL Article 2:205(3), under
the dispatch rule, the contract is concluded when performance
of the act begins.' 07 In common-law systems, when an accept-
ance is dispatched by mail or telegram, it is referred to as the
mailbox or postbox rule,' 08 in the German system as Ubermit-
103 See U.C.C. § 1-201.
104 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 1:303(5); CISG, supra note 6, art. 22;
UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.10.
105 This theory is also adopted by BGB, supra note 32, § 130.1; ABGB, supra
note 32, § 862; C.c., supra note 32, arts. 1326.1, 1335; GREEK CML CODE § 192;
OR, supra note 32, art. 5.
106 For the North American system, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 45, § 3.22;
Williston, supra note 60, § 6:34. For the English system, see CmrrY, supra note
60, § 67; G.H.TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 25 (8' ed. 1991).
107 See also UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 5, art. 2.6(3); CISG, supra note
6, art. 18(3).
108 Since 1818, when the famous English case Adams v. Lindsell, 106 E.R. 250
(1818), was decided, it has been held that the moment of a contract's conclusion
where the acceptance is made by letter or telegram is determined by the mailbox
rule. See also Dunlop v. Higgins, 73 R.R. 98 (1848) (where the rule is clearly formu-
lated); Harris L.R. 7 Ch. 587 (1872); Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, L.R. 5 C.P.D. 344
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tlungstheorie or Absendetheorie, and in the Spanish system as
Teoria de la Expedici6n or the Expedition Theory. The contract
is concluded when the offeree sends his acceptance to the of-
feror. Besides the CISG, which adopts the Expedition Theory as
an exception to the Receipt Theory, the Spanish Commercial
Code also adopts this theory in order to determine when a com-
mercial contract has been concluded.109 The Expedition Theory
leads to one important consequence: the transmission risk of
the acceptance has to be born by the offeror. 110
It is possible that a contract will be concluded despite the
fact that the acceptance arrives after the legal or contractual
period of time allocated for acceptance has lapsed. This is
known as a late acceptance and is regulated in PECL Article
2:207, which follows CISG Article 21 and UNIDROIT Principles
Article 2.9. Under the late acceptance rule, two possible situa-
tions exist: 1. an acceptance that arrives late by fault of the of-
feree, that is, it is presumed that the delay was caused by the
offeree either because he sent the acceptance after the allowed
time period or because he sent it without taking into account
the time needed for it to reach the offeror; 111 and 2. an accept-
ance that arrives late because of an irregularity in the means of
transmission, for instance, a strike of postal employees.1 12 In
the first case, the acceptance cannot conclude the contract, but
rather, the offeror may orally inform the offeree or send him a
notice validating the acceptance, at which moment the contract
(1880). See generally CHITTY, supra note 60 at 111-17. The mailbox rule is also
adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63 (where it states that
'unless the offer provides otherwise, an acceptance made in a manner and by a
medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual
assent as soon as it is put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether
it ever reaches the offeror.")
The mailbox rule was created to protect the offeree from the offeror's revoca-
tion power and its fumction is to determine the moment of a contract's conclusion.
Thus, the CISG does not adopt the mailbox rule as a general rule for contract con-
clusion, since the reasons behind this rule are not present in the CISG. For in-
stance, the CISG does not demand the requirement of consideration to deem an
offer irrevocable, making the offeror's revocation power under the CISG more
narrow.
109 See C. COM., supra note 15, art. 54.
110 At least theoretically, because in practice the rule is not applied in the com-
mon-law systems when the result is absurd. For the English system, see CHrrY,
supra note 60, § 69; for the North American, see MuRRAY, supra note 57, § 47.
111 See PECL, supra note 1, art. 2:207(1).
112 See id. art. 2:207.
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would be considered concluded. In the second case, the opposite
holds true, and the acceptance is considered capable of conclud-
ing the contract, reserving for the offeror the right to declare it
otherwise, in which case he would be required to orally inform
the offeree or dispatch a notice of his intention without delay. If
the offeror does not communicate with the offeree, the contract
is concluded upon receipt of the acceptance. It is important to
note, however, that in practice the term "without delay" gener-
ally allows the offeror the maximum amount of time allowed, in
which to inform the offeree that the offer has expired. In con-
trast, when the offeror has fixed a period of time in which to
accept the offer, the offeree must accept it within such time. A
problem arises in those cases where the offeror does not specify
a beginning, also known as dies a quo, or ending limit to the
period for acceptance (i.e., he has only indicated that the offer
must be accepted within a month.) In those cases, PECL Article
1:304 applies.
In regard to the place of formation of the contract, the
PECL, as well as the CISG, both do not foresee a rule to such
effect, which leads one to believe that it is a question that is
governed by the applicable domestic law.
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